| Chechen
War 1994-96 |
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Chechen fighters dressed for the occasion. |
| Background |
| The Chechen War of 1994-96 was one of the bloodiest conflicts of the late 20th Century and a convincing example of what a small, highly motivated guerrilla force could do against a military superpower. Adding to a growing list of superpower defeats at the hands of tiny countries (U.S, in Vietnam, French in Algeria, Soviets in Afghanistan), Russia's war in Chechnya demonstrated many things. 1. The strength of separatist politics in the Caucasus. 2. The virtual collapse of the Russian conscript military effectiveness. 3. The importance of home front support. Chechnya lies on the northern slope of the Caucasus mountains, a chain of high peaks that spans the land between Black Sea and Caspian Sea. The vast oil reserves in the Caspian made the area the largest oil-producing region of the Soviet Union. Along with the other Caucasus republics of Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan, Chechnya occupies the high ground at one of the world's great geopolitical crossroads. The Caucasus have always existed at the frontiers of empires, whether it be the Persians in the 1400's, the Ottoman Turks in the 1700's or Tsarist Russia's in the 1800's. At various times throughout history the Caucasus have been overrun by everybody from Tamerlane's Mongols to Russia's Cossacks in vain attempts to add the area to their empires. But the Caucasus has always been at the periphery of those empires and the indigenous peoples never completely subdued. The geography of high mountains, dense beech forests have assisted this. But more important is the indomitable fighting spirit and fierce independence of the Caucasus people as a group.
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| Russian History in the Caucasus |
| One might say that the Russians have spent the last 200 or so years getting their asses kicked in the Caucasus on a fairly regular basis. But the Chechen population has paid a heavy price for each Russian military incursion on their land. Why is the Caucasus region so important to Russia? Throughout the 18th and 19th centuries, Russia's natural competition in Southern Asia was the Ottoman Empire. The Ottomans ruled as far as the Caucasus and the Russians wanted to safeguard the southern borders against the Turks. By taking the Caucasus the Russians would have access to the warm water ports of the Black Sea. They would also be able to link up with Christian Georgia just on the southern side of the mountains, which had become a Russian protectorate by a 1783 treaty. By controlling the Caucasus, Moscow would have less to worry about from the Muslim populations in Azerbaijan, Dagestan and Chechnya in the event war came with Turkey. But overcoming the mountain peoples of the Caucasus has never been conclusively achieved. Russian expeditions in the 1700's against Chechnya encountered the same problems as that of 1994: supply headaches, a geography perfectly suited to guerrilla warfare, and demoralized Russian troops fighting intensely independent and nearly suicidal Chechen resistance. The expeditions took on similar characteristics of massed Russian forces getting cut to pieces in the mountains then pulling back and razing villages and killing thousands of people throughout lengthy campaigns. The Russians held the plains but whenever they pursued the guerillas into the mountains they met with costly failures. The only thing these expeditions accomplished was to win the lasted hatred of the Chechens and the idea that the Russians were their natural enemies. The Chechens got a brief taste of independence in 1917 when the Tsar was overthrown in the Russian Revolution, but in 1920 the Bolsheviks incorporated all the Caucasus into the U.S.S.R. The will to create independent republics in the Caucasus created isolated outbreaks throughout the next 20 years. In an effort to control the Chechen nationalism problem, Stalin deported 500,000 Chechens in 1944 to the frozen steppes of Kazakstan, hoping to eradicate the problem once and for all by forcibly resettling the entire population. Without any infrastructure to absorb all those people in the middle of a severe winter, close to 70,000 Chechens died within months to exposure and hunger. After Stalin's death in 1953 Krusschev loosened the regulations and allowed Chechens to filter back to the Caucasus. Needless to say, the episode did little for Chechen's love toward the Russians.
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| Why it started this time. |
| Even
with all this history, the Russians still stumbled into another unwinnable
war with Chechnya in 1994. With the breakup of the Soviet Union in 1991,
independence movements But
that didn't help certain issues that modern societies depend on a state
to take care of, such as road building, maintenance of the economy,
legal process, etc. Dudayev's government seemed not to know what to
do with the newfound independence. Stripped of the benefits that the
Soviet era offered, soon everything from garbage collection to pension
payments to aging Russians fell by the wayside. Dudayev, who seemed
to be better at In 1993, Yeltsin defeated the Communist Party opposition and a new constitution was drawn up. With things under control in Moscow, he could now focus on other issues such as the Chechen problem. Chechnya's refusal to sign a unification treaty with Russia made the situation even more pressing. Throughout 1993, Russian military hardware and troops began building up on Chechnya's borders. Money and guns were given to the anti-Dudayev opposition movement. In November 1993 Dudayev won a national election as the leader of the country and the remaining Moscow party officials were finally thrown out. Yeltsin now had a full-fledged separatist threat on his hands.
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| New Year's Day, 1994 |
| After the anti-Dudayev groups botched a coup attempt in November, the Russians realized that they would have to do the job themselves. The prefered method was a massive bombardment of the capital city of Grozny, followed by an armored attack which would capture Dudayev's government and oust him. Eager to grab legitimacy on the world political stage, Yeltsin wanted a quick and decisive victory against the Chechen separatists. Unfortunately, he didn't read much history. The Russians began bombing Grozny in December. Originally designed to hit just military targets, the bombing soon ran out of those and began indiscriminately destroying apartment buildings and anything else that was standing in central Grozny. Because there were more ethnic Russians in Grozny than Chechens, this was a ridiculous policy. It soon became obvious that the strategy was to reduce the city to ruins in the hopes the Chechens would simply capitulate to Moscow's demands as soon as the tanks rolled in, civilian casualties be damned.
On New Years Day 1994 several Russian armored columns drove into Grozny after an intensive three-day bombardment. Their objective was the presidential palace, a massive concrete building where Dudayev was directing the government and the defense of Grozny. What followed was one of the worst military routs the Russians had sustained since the days of Afghanistan. Hiding
in the narrow bombed-out streets were teams of Chechens armed with rocket
propelled grenades (RPG) and machine guns. Nothing high tech, but for
urban street fighting they were exactly the right To avenge the disaster, the Russians reopened the bombardment and set about reducing the city to rubble. Three weeks later Russian forces finally managed to dislodge the Chechens from the key Presidential Palace but by the time the stronghold fell, Dudayev and his officers were gone. The Russians had failed to seal off Grozny so Chechen reinforcements came and went throughout the entire campaign. It took two more months of heavy fighting before the Russians gained full control of Grozny. The Chechens melted into the hills to do what they do best - guerrilla warfare. Russian troops in the remains of central Grozny. |